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ON PROPERTY SELF-EXEMPLIFICATION: 
REJOINDER TO MILLER 
William F. Vallicella 
My defense of the divine simplicity depends crucially on the possibility of 
property self-exemplification. Barry Miller, though a friend of the simplicity 
doctrine, rejects the possibility in question. This note provides some consid-
erations in favor of property self-exemplification as well as a response to 
Miller's objection. 
Are there any self-exemplifying first-level properties? If there are, then some 
properties are both first- and second-level. According to Barry Miller, "no 
first-level properties at all can be self-exemplifying ... "l If so, my attempt to 
make sense of the divine simplicity by construing the attributes of God as 
self-exemplifying properties whose self-exemplification entails their identity 
with an individual is mistaken.2 
Miller's view is not merely that there are no first-level self-exemplifying 
properties, but that there are no self-exemplifying properties at any level. 
Moreover, his view is that this can be established on purely logical grounds. 
Here are three considerations that speak against his view. 
a. The first-level property of being blue exemplifies the second-level prop-
erty of being a property, and this latter property exemplifies itself: the 
property of being a property is itself a property. 
b. The first-level property of being unextended is itself unextended, and 
so exemplifies itself. 
c. One may prove that not every predicate picks out a property in a manner 
analogous to the way Russell proved that not every condition specifies 
a set. If every predicate picks out a property, then 'is non-self-exempli-
fying' picks out a property. But there is no such property P as the 
property of being non-self-exemplifying. For P is either self-exemplify-
ing or it is not. If P is self-exemplifying, then P is not self-exemplifying. 
But if P is not self-exemplifying, then P is self-exemplifying. This is a 
contradiction; hence P does not exist. 
This quite lucid piece of argumentation presupposes that it at least makes 
logical sense to say of a property that it is self-exemplifying. But if Miller is 
right, this does not make sense. So if Miller is right, our beautiful piece of 
argumentation is senseless. This indicates that Miller is wrong. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 11 No.3 July 1994 
All rights reserved. 
478 
REJOINDER TO MILLER 479 
All of this suggests that the idea of self-exemplification is quite unprob-
lematic; so any argument against it will have to be impressive indeed. 
Miller approaches the issue of self-exemplification linguistically via self-
predication. Let us take as our example the sentence, 'Being unextended is 
unextended.' Miller denies that this is an example of self-predication, and thus 
denies that it expresses property self-exemplification. What is the argument? 
1. Being unextended is unextended 
may be expressed, according to Miller, as 
2. What ' __ is unextended' stands for is unextended. 
Now what is the logical form of (2)? Is it of the form, singular term/1st-level 
predicate? No, according to Miller, since 'What " ___ is F" stands for' 
involves second-level quantification, quantification over properties. To see 
this, consider 
3. Tom and Mary are what ' __ is F' stands for. 
To the question, And what is that? appropriate answers are 'insensitive' or 'a 
human being.' But one cannot further ask, 'Which human being?' or 'Which 
insensitive?' Hence the use of 'what " ___ is F" stands for' in (3) involves 
second-level quantification. From this Miller concludes that (2) is of the form, 
2nd-level predicate/1st-level predicable. It follows that (1) is not an example 
of self-predication. 
This argument is less that convincing for at least two reasons. 
Note first that substitution of 'a human being' into (3) yields 
3.' Tom and Mary are what ' __ is a human being' stands for. 
But (3') makes no sense as can be seen if we attach, as we ought to be able 
to, a 'namely' clause: 
3." Tom and Mary are what ' __ is a human being' stands fOT, namely, is 
a human being. 
To make sense of (3"), the last 'is' must be deleted; but then the same 
compliment would have to be paid to (3'), the result being: 
3.'" Tom and Mary are what 'a human being' stands fOT. 
But this wreaks havoc with Miller's claim that (3) involves second-level 
quantification, quantification over properties. Following Frege, Miller holds 
that properties are unsaturated or incomplete; as such, they can only be the 
referents of correspondingly incomplete expressions. 'A human being,' how-
ever, is not incomplete, and therefore cannot stand for a property.3 
Secondly, there is no need to make the move from (1) to (2). (1) is elliptical 
for 
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I'. The property of being unextended is unextended. 
Now 'The property of being unextended' is a singular term denoting an 
abstract object. If so, the logical form of (I) is singular term/predicate. Is the 
predicate first- or second-level? That depends on how we understand 'first-
level predicate.' I take Miller's view to be that first-level predicates are 
predicates of objects, where objects (as opposed to functions) are the referents 
of singular terms. On this understanding of 'first-level predicate,' the logical 
form of (1) is singular term/first-level predicate. My view, however, is that 
first-level predicates are predicates of individuals, where an individual is 
anything that exemplifies properties but is not itself a property. So on my 
view the logical form of (1) is singular term/second-level predicate. Either 
way, we have self-predication, by which I understand the predication of a 
property of itself. Now if a property is truly predicated of itself, then the 
property is self-exemplifying. 
None of this is likely to impress Miller, since he rejects an assumption I 
am making, namely, that properties are complete or 'saturated' entities. As 
already noted, Miller follows Frege in holding that properties are incomplete 
or 'unsaturated' (ungesaettigt). But what is it to be incomplete? There is an 
ambiguity in Frege and also in Miller on this point as between saying that 
Incomplete entities are incapable of independent existence 
and that 
Incomplete entities cannot be named (are not objects). 
The claims are distinct in that neither entails the other. Miller appears to 
endorse both. As for the first, he says that properties are incomplete in that 
they are "individuated ab alio and are incapable of independent existence ... "4 
Thus Fido's blackness is not a universal, but a particular, a property-instance. 
Moreover, it is a property-instance which, unlike the tropes of D. C. Williams 
and Keith Campbell, cannot independently exist but can only exist in Fido. 
Does this rule out self-exemplification? Not obviously. If point P's being 
unextended is an incomplete property-instance, it is a particular that cannot 
exist independently of P. But this seems to allow us to say that the property 
in question both exists in P and in itself, thereby accommodating the datum 
that the property of being unextended is itself unextended. 
To exclude self-exemplification Miller must reach for the draconian thesis 
that no incomplete entity (hence no property-instance) can be named. On this 
thesis we cannot name what the predicate in 'Fido is black' stands for.5 'Fido's 
blackness,' if it succeeds in picking out anything, picks out an object, a 
complete entity, hence not what the predicate in 'Fido is black' stands for. 
This implies that no incomplete entity can be identical with any of its prop-
erties, which in turn implies that no incomplete entity can exemplify itself, 
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since a self-exemplifying property is one that is identical with one of its 
properties. 
The draconian thesis, however, appears to issue in incoherence. Consider 
the triad: 
4. Property-instances are incomplete (unnameable) entities 
5. Fido's blackness is a property-instance 
6. Fido's blackness is an incomplete (unnameable) entity. 
Miller is cOIPmitted to both (4) and (5).6 Now (6) follows from (4) and (5). 
But (6) is false, indeed self-contradictory: 'Fido's blackness' names a com-
plete entity. So given that (5) is true, (4) must be false. 
It thus appears that Miller's rejection of property self-exemplification rests 
on an incoherent foundation. Miller faces the same paradox Frege faced: The 
concept horse is not a concept.7 In Miller it takes the form: The property 
Fido's blackness is not a property. But in that case Miller's doctrine of 
properties cannot be coherently stated - or whistled either. 
Chandler, Arizona 
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